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SITUATION

V.

BLOCKADING BY MINES.

There is war between States X and Y. Other States
are neutral. War vessels of State X are blockading a
port of State Y. Tvvo of the war vessels of State X are
called away, leaving only two to aid in maintaining an
effective blockade. The two remaining vessels lay a line
of automatic contact mines of vvhich they give notice to
neutrals.
The neutrals protest on the ground that this is not a
legiti1natemethod of blockade and maintain that themines
should be re1noved.
What action should be taken~
SOLUTION.

Under the strict law such use of 1nines is not prohibited.'
It vvould see1n, however, that mines should not be used
for the maintenance of a commercial blockade and that
neutrals would have good cause to protest against such
use, whjch protest a belligerent should heed.
NOTES ON SITUATION V.

Effective blockade.-According to the Declaration of
Paris, 1856, to which n1ost States acceded "blockades, in
order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say,
maintained by a force sufficient to prevent access to the
coast of the enemy." This principle has been so generally
recognized as to be little questioned. The words '' sufficient force" have received varied interpretatjons. It is
not certain just what constitutes a "sufficient force," nor
of vvhat character such force must be. Sir Alexander
Cockburn, in the case of Geipel v. Smith, said:
In the eye of the law a blockade is effective if the enemies' ships are
in such numbers and position as to render the running of the blockade
a matter of danger, although some vessels may succeed in getting
through. (Law Reports, 7 Queen's Bench, 404.)
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The definition of blockade, according to the armed neutralities of 1780 and 1800, spoke of its maintenance by
vessels. '"fhe Declaration of Paris of 1856, however, mentions "a sufficient force" not defining the nature of the
force.
·
Treaty provisions.- Article 13 of the treaty between the
United States and Italy of 1871 contains the. statement
that those StatesBeing desirous of removing every uncertainty which may hitherto
have arisen respecting that which upon principles of fairness and justice ought to constitute a legal blockade, they hereby expressly declare
that such places only shall be considered blockaded as shall be actually
invested by naval forces capable of preventing the entry of neutrals,
and so stationed as to create an evident danger on their part to attempt it.

There may in some cases be a doubt as to what might
properly constitute "naval forces capable of preventing
entry of neutrals." Some maintain that there may be
question of the propriety of the use of mines for such pur' regard mines as legitimate as any form of
pose; others
naval warfare, 'Yhether for blockade or other service.
Opinion of court.-ln the case of the Oircassian in 1864,
Mr. Justice Chase said, in regard to blockade:
It may be made effectual by batteries ashore as well as by ships
afloat. In the case of an inland port, the most effective blockade would
be maintained by batteries commanding the river or inlet by which it
may be approached, supported by a naval force. sufficient to warn off
innocent and capture offending vessels, attempting to enter. .(2 \Vallace, U. S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 135.)

Obstructions in aid of blockade, stone.-Speaking · in
1862 of the stone placed in Charleston Harbor to aid in

maintaining the· blockade and of the opposition raised by
some European States to this method, Secretary Seward
in a letter to Minister Dayton, at Paris, said:
Hitherto such obstructi~ns have been regarded as an ordinary military appliance of war. No American ever conceived that the human
hand could place obstructions in a river which the same hand could not
remove. * * * We were, therefore, surprised, and even incredulous, when we saw that the placing of obstructions in the channels
leading to Charleston was, in Europe, regarded as an act of peculiar
and ruthless severity. (U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862,
p. 316.)
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In a letter two days earlier to Mr. Adams, 11:r. Seward
said:
I am not prepared to recognize the right of other nations to object to
the measure of placing artificial obstructions in the channels of rivers
leading to ports which have been seized by the insurgents in their
attempt to overthrow this Government. I am, nevertheless, desirous
that the exaggerations on that subject which have been indulged
abroad may be corrected. I have, therefore, applied to the Navy
Department for information, and I have now to inform you that between
the channels leading to the harbor of Charleston which have been so
obstructed there still remain two other channels, neither of which has
been so obstructed, and in which there has been no design to place any
artificial obstructions. These are the Swash channel and a part of the
so-called 11affit's channel. These two latter channels are guarded, and
passage through them prevented only by the blockading naval forces.
(Ibid., p. 36.)

In 1884 certain Chinese harbors \vere in part blocked by
stone. In a co1nmunication to the Secretary of State at
this ti1ne the United States minister to China says:
On the lOth of January I was informed by the British minister, Sir
Harry Parkes, and the German charge d'affaires, Count Tattenbach,
that dispatches had been received from their consuls at Canton saying
that the Chinese authorities were preparing to obstruct the water
approaches to Canton, and that the effect of these obstructions would
be to imperil, if not to prevent, navigation. The German consul
reported that \Vhampoa would be "totally blocked."
I telegraphed :Mr. Consul Seymour for information, and his reply I
inclose. Mr. Seymour, as you will observe, said that there would be"serious obstructions without equivalent benefits." * * * The
United States during the rebellion saw fit to obstruct the channels in
Charleston Harbor by sinking ships laden with stone to secure an
effective. blockade. Germany during her latest war with France protected her Balt:ic ports with torpedoes. I should have felt some embarrassment in seeking to persuade the yamen that what Germany and
the United States regarded as honorable warfare could not be permitted
to them. (U. S. Foreign Relations, 1884, p. 66.)

A later dispatch, No. 267, from Secretary Frelinghuysen says:
Even, however, under this favorable modification (the opening of
channels 100 to 150 feet in width) the obstruction to the channel at
Canton and Whampoa can only be tolerated as a temporary measure,
to be removed as soon as the special occasion therefor shall have passed,
and under no circumstances to be admitted as a precedent for setting
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<>bstacles to open navigation at the treaty ports in time of peace , u nder
pretext of being intended for ultimate strategic defense in the cont ingency of future war. (Ibid., p. 96.)

A dispatch of Secretary Bayard to Mr. Denby, United
States minister to China, July 28, 1886, says:
Your No. 141 is before me, and brings to the Department, with much
·c learness, a question of great interest. It is unquestionable that a
belligerent may, during war, place obstructions in the channel of a
belligerent port, for the purpose _of excluding vessels of the other bellig€rent which seek the port either as hostile cruisers or as blockade runners. This was done by the Dutch when attacked by Spain in the
time of Philip II; by England when attacked by the Dutch in the
time of Charles II; by the United States when attacked by Great
Britain in the late civil war; by Russia at the siege of Sebastopol; and
by Germany during the Franco-German war of 1870. But while such
is the law, it is equally settled by the law of nations that when war
-ceases such obstructions, when impeding navigation in channels in
which great ships are accustomed to pass, must be removed by the
territorial authorities. Such is the rule apart from treaty; and it was
implicitly admitted by Mr. Seward, when, in replying to the remonstrances by the British Government on the placing by the block:ading authorities of obstructions in the harbor of Charleston, he stated
that these obstructions were placed there merely temporarily. Were
there any doubt about this question, which I maintain there is not, it
would be settled by the provisions of our treaties with China, which
virtually make Canton a free port, to which our merchant ships are
-entitled to have free access in time of peace. · You are therefore instructed to make use of the best efforts in your power to induce the Chinese Government to remove the obstructions in the Canton River,
which, as you state, operate to close the port of Canton to the merchant
vessels of the United States.
In sending to you this instruction, I affirm the instruction of Mr.
Frelinghuysen to Mr. Young , No. 267, dated April18, 1884, printed in
the Foreign Relations of that year. (U. S. Foreign Relations 1886,
p. 95.)

Professor Moore summarizes the Chinese action in the
Chino-Japanese vvar of 189_4 as follows:
During the war with Japan in 1894, the Tsung-li yamen announced
the closure of Foochow for purposes of defense. One entrance was
left open, and a place was designated as an anchorage for foreign and
Chinese steamers outside the mouth of the river, where they were
required to discharge and load cargo, which was conveyed to and
from Foochow by lighters registered at the customs. These lighters
followed an indicated route and plied only in the daytime. In reporting these measures, the American charge at Peking observed that,
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burdensome as they doubtless would prove to be, no objection could
be made to them in view of the demoralization of the Chinese naval
forces, Foochow being an important naval depot which must be
·guarded at all hazards. The Government of the United States reaffirmed the position taken by Mr. Frelinghuysen in his telegram to
Mr. Young of January 22, 1884, and by J\1r. Bayard, in his instructions to Mr. Denby of July 28, 1886. (7 Int. Law Digest, p. 858;
U. S. Foreign Relations 1894, Appendix I, p. 71.)

Obstructions in aid of bloclcade, sunken vessels .-Professor Lawrence, writing of the Russo-Japanese war of
1904, said:
In the present war no one, even in Russia, has hinted that the
Japanese went beyond their rights in attempting to block the channel
leading to the inner harbor of Port Arthur by sunken merchantmen,
or in mining the sea pathway which they had observed the Russian
ironclads to take when going in and coming out. (vVar and Neutrality
in the Far East, 2d ed., p. 104.)

Use of mines during blockade.-Sir Thomas Barclay
says of the general use of mines at Port Arthur:
During the blockade of Port Arthur, the Russians laid mines in all
parts of the sea adjacent to that port. The Japanese allege that from
the beginning to the end of the siege they removed 395 Russian mines.
The removal continued after the siege, so that the total number removed they estimate to have much exceeded this number. In an
excellent article, dated November 24, 1905, published in the Times of
December 27 , the able Tokyo correspondent of that paper remarked
that " this chapter of history would not have retained a prominent
place in general recollection, had it not been vividly illustrated from
time to time by shocking disasters to merchant steamers, which, while
navigating routes comparatively remote from the scene of the combat, struck errant mines, and were sent to the bottom.'' The Russians
were not alone the offenders. The Japanese made almost equally
extensive use of such mines, as has been learned from a document
compiled at the Japanese Hydrographers' Office in answer to an application from the Russian headquarter staff for information as to the
locality of any mines placed by the Japanese jn the neighborhood
of Vladivostok. The Japanese Admiralty replied, says the same correspondent, by a detailed statement showing that two mine-laying
operations had been carried out by the Japanese in Vladivostok
waters-the one in April, 1904, to render impassable the entrance and
exit through the straits which must be passed to reach the port; the
other, about a year later, when the Baltic fleet had arrived in Far
Eastern waters. In this case 715 mines were laid ''right across Peter
the Great Bay, from Askolcl Island to Korsakoff Island, a distance of
forty miles." These figures show that there must ha,re been a mine at
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about every 100 yards. "In spite of this great plexus of destructive
engines,'' communications with Vladivostok continued undisturbed
during the period of eight months-from April 15, 1905, when the
Askold-Korsakoff line was laid, to November 9 of the same year-when
the Japanese Admiralty replied to the Russian inquiry. (Problems of
International Practice and Diplomacy~ p. 59.)

Discussion of the use of mines at the Hague Conference;
1907 .-In the letter of instructions as to the Second
Hague Conference, Sir Edward Grey says to Sir Edward
Fry in regard to mines:
15. His J\1:ajesty's Government would view with satisfaction the
abandon1nent of the employment of automatic mines in naval warfare altogether. Failing the acceptance of such a total prohibition,
they earnestly hope that the einployment of these engines of war will
only be sanctioned under the strictest limitations. They would advocate an arrangement by which the use of automatic mines should be
limited to territorial waters, and, if possible, to such portions of terri.
torial waters as adjoin naval bases or fortified ports. All mines thus
employed should be efft:ctively anchored, and so constructed that, in
the event of their breaking adrift, they would either automatically
become harmless or sink, and that in any case their active life should
not exceed a limited period of say six months. (Correspondence Respecting the Second Peace Conference, Parliamentary Papers Misc.
No. 1 (1908) [Cd. 3857].)

Various questions were raised as to the meaning of
any prohibition of the use of mines for the maintenance
of a blockade. Great Britain proposed an article to the
following effect:
L'emploi de mines sous-marines automatiques de contact pour
etablir ou maintenir un blocus de cmnmerce est interdit.

·The British proposition became the poinf of departure
for discussion on this topic. It was asked whether such
a regulation 'vould prohibit the use of mines by the
blockading fleet for its own defense, etc. Captain Ottley
replied that the intent was to prevent the closing of a
great commercial port by the exclusive use of a .line of
mines. The president of the commission, M. Hagerup,
said that two main questions seemed to be raised:
1°. Les batiments etablissant ou maintenant un blocus pourront-ils
employer des mines pour leur defense personnelle?
2°. Peut-on etablir un blocus de commerce uniquement a l'aide de
mines? Tout le monde parait etre d'accord pour repondreinegativement ala seconde question.
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The discussion in regard to the use of automatic contact mines introduces the conflict of interests between
neutral and belligerent. The belligerent of large resources, ample military forces, varied and extended
commercial interests would naturally desire that these
should have the greatest freedom in use. The belligerent of small resources~ both commercial and military,
would naturally desire to use the most economical means
of defense and to use these means with the least possible
restraint. Some of the States having less military resources regard mines as essential to their protection
against the more powerful and as a possible means by
which they can close the ports of the great powers.
Neutrals may also be involved in many ways. This is
to some extent shown in the remarks of the Italian delegate, Captain Castiglia, at the opening of the discussion
on the subject of submarine mines at the Second I-Iague
Conference, June 27, 1907:
L'emploi des mines est un moyen de defense auquel ne pourront
jamais renoncer ni les grancles puissances qui ont une longue etendue
de cotes a proteger, ni, a plus forte raison, celles ·qui ne possedant pas
une grande n1arine de guerre trouveront dans l'emploi de ces armes un
puissant auxiliaire a leur defense maritime.
C'est la defense la 1noins couteuse et pour cela elle est a la portee de
t ous. Mais si l'on pense aux desastreuses consequences que ces instruments de guerre peuvent causer au commerce pacifique des neutres
et a l'exercice de la peche, pendant et meme apres la guerre, c'est
bien naturel que l'on cherche a mettre quelque frein dans l'usage de
ces terribles instruments pour en eliminer les consequences fatales.
l\1ais les types des mines adoptes sont si differents, et les cas particuliers de leur emploi sont si nombreux, que meme avec toute la meilleure bonne volonte, il serait impossible de dieter des regles generales
pouvant etre toujours sui vies fidelement.
La defense sous-marine ideale dans le sens de ne produire aucun
dommage aux navires des neutres est celle qu'on obtient avec des obstructions composees de mines fixes, que des observateurs font eclater
moyennant l'electricite. lYfais l'emploi de ces mines est non seulement limite pres des cotes, mais aussi il n'est pas toujours possible.

Sir Ernest Satow, speaking before the Third Commission at the Second Hague Conference, on September 17,
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1907, said of the amended form of the British proposition

to absolutely prohibit blockade by mines:
L'article 4, alinea 3, declare qu'il "est interdit de placer des mines
automatiques de contact d-evant les cotes et 1es ports de I 'adversaire
d ans le seul but d'intercepter 1a navigation de commerce." C'est la
une clause qui laisse au belligerant une echappato:i!'e bien dangereuse.
On avait propose dans 1e Comite de ne permettre 1a pose de mines
devant un port de commerce qu'a 1a condition qu'i1 y eu.t dans ce port
au moins une grande unite de combat, mais 1a proposition fut vivement combattue et dut, par consequent, etre retiree. Cependant il
serait, a notre avis, tout a fait contraire a 1' esprit et a la lettre de la
Declaration de Paris de permettre qu'un b1ocus fut maintenue totalement ou en partie a 1'aide de mines. Je me permets de vous rappeler
1e texte meme du passage qui a trait a cette question-"les blocus,
pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectiis," c'est-a-dire maintenu
par une force suffisante pour interdire reellement I 'acces du littoral de
1'ennemi. II est clair qu'il s'agit ici d'une force suffisante composee
de navires de guerre, et que 1'on ne peut comprendre dans cette categorie des mines sous-marines, qui ne sont sujettes a aucun controle, et
qui ne contiennent en elles aucune preuve evidente de 1'intention de
fermer l'acces du port bloque. II serait par consequent bon de tirer
ce point au clair, afin de ne 1aisser subsister aucune equivoque, et
c'est pourquoi nous avons l'honneur de proposer le texte suivant a la
place de celui que nous avons sous 1e~ yeux.

It was recognized in the discussions of Article II of the
convention relative to the laying of automatic contact
submarine mines that the introduction of the last clause
would introduce possible complications. The article is
as folloV\rs:
It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and ports
of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping.

According to the last clause the prohibition extends to
the mines laid with the "sole object of intercepting commercial shipping." This introduces the question of intent, which is ahvays difficult to prove. The intent is,
however, restricted by the introduction of the adjective
u sole" (le seul but) .
The report of the subcommission vvhich had the matter
of automatic contact mines under consideration vvas as
relates to the question of blockade by mines as follows:
ART. 4. Devant les cotes et les ports de leurs adversaires, les belligerants
peuvent placer des mines automatiques de contact amarree.(l dans les limites
·i ndiquees aux deux articles precedents
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Toutefois, ils ne peuvent depasser la limite de trois milles marins devant
les ports, qui ne sont pas des ports de guerre, que s'il s'y trouve des Ctablissements de constructions navales ou de radoub, appartenant a l' Etat.
Il est interdit de placer des mines automatiques de contact devant les
cotes et les ports de l' adversaire dans le seul but d'intercepter la navigation
de commerce.
Apres avoir fixe des limites a 1a defense des cotes, le reglement
s'occupe dans l'article 4 de l'attaque. Les deux premiers alineas de
cet article se rapportent aux limites que, dans l'espace, les belligerants
doivent garder en posant des mines anlarrees devant les cotes ennemies;
le troisieme alinea y apporte une nouvelle restriction, c'est que meme
la, ou devant les cotes ennemies on peut placer dans la zone des deux
premiers alineas, des mines amarrees, on ne peut pas en placer ''dans
le seul but d'intercepter le cmnmerce."
1) Occupons-nous d 'abord de cette derniere disposition. Elle doit
son existence a une proposition britannique , contenue dans le projet
primitif de la Delegation de Grande-Bretagne et portant que "il est
interdit d'e1nployer des 1nines sons-marines automatiques de contact
pour etablir OU Inaintenir Un bloCUS de COlllnlerce.''
Dans la Sous-Cmnmission, M.le Contre-A1niral Arago fit remarquer,
qu 'avant tout il serait necessaire de deterrniner la portee precise de
cette disposition. '' Interdit-elle par exemple aux vaisseaux belligerants, qui etablissent un blocus, tout usage de mines sous-marines,
me1ne pour leur defense propre , OU, au contraire, a-t-elle SeJJlement
pour but d'interdire l ' etablissement d'un blocus a l'aide d'un cordon
de Inines SOUS-Inarines place devant une cote ennemie?", a quoi M. le
Capitaine de Vaisseau Ottley repondit ''que la pensee a laquelle
cette diRposition s'est inspiree, etait !'interdiction a Un belligerant de
fenner un . port de commerce de son ennemi par l'emploi de mines
automatiques de contact."
Devant cette position de la question on dut se deinander, si la d~s
cussion de la proposition britannique n'outrepassait pas les limites de
la cmnpetence de la 3eme Commission. On fit observer que la question
de savoir quant et comment un blocus peut etre etabli, est du ressort
de la 4eme Cmn1nission, qui aurait a s'occuper de la matiere du blocus
de guerre; c'est nota1n1nement a la 4eme Commission qu'il devrait
apparteni_r de se prononcer sur toute question concernant_l'effectivite
du blocus. Apres un echange de vues au sein de la Sous-Con1mission,
le President put constater l'unanhnite de la Sons-Commission a ne
s'occuper que de l'une des face~ que presentait la proposition britannique; il s'agirait seulement de determiner, en examinant les mines,
cmnme moyen de nuire a l'ennemi, si l'on peut s'en servir dans le but
de barrer la navigation commerciale de l'adversaire-question a
laquelle, paralt-il, on devrait repondre negativement. Cela etabli, on
pourrait confier au Comite le soin de bien fai~e ressortir cette pensee
commune, tout en laissant hors de discussion !'application, au sujet
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de l'emploi des mines, des principes de la declaration de Paris concernant l'effectivite du blocus.
C'est en effet dans cet ordre d'idees que le Comite eut a s'occuper de
la proposition anglaise. On commen~a par etre d'accord sur ce point,
que, pour se soustraire a tout equivoque, il fallait abandonner le terme
de blocus, employe dans cette proposition.

This Article 4 subsequently was amended and became
Article 2.
ART. 2. Il est interdit de placer des mines automatiques de contact
devant les cotes et les ports de l'adversaire dans le seul but d'intercepter
la navigation de cornmerce.

Opinions of text writers.-There have been claims that
the blockade of ports must be wholly by war vessels.
Fauchille says of this subject:
En general, les traites qui ont ·precede la declaration de Paris (voir
notammment traites de 1780 et 1800) ne precisaient point- la nature
des vaisseaux qu'on pouvait employer dans un blocus. La declaration
de 1856, elle-meme, est restee muette sur ce point; seulement !'abrogation de la course qu'elle a prononcee ne peut permettre aucun doute
a cet egard. Cette derniere observation s'applique egalement aux
conventions posterieures a 1856. Les lois interieures des Etats sont au
contraire plus explicites su~ la question: la plupart reconnaissent
expressement le principe qu'un navire de gnerre seul pent cortstituer
un blocus: nons citerons notammment !'ordonnance des Pays-Bas du
26 janvier 1781 (art. 6)~ les ordonnances suedoises du 21 janvier 1804
(§XI) et du 8 avril 1854 (§ 4), Ies reglements danois du 1er mai 1848 ·
(§ 1) et du 16 fevrier 1864 (§ 1), le reglement de la Prusse de 20 juin 1864
(§ 1), !'ordonnance autrichienne du 3 mars 1864 (§ 1), et c~lle du 21
mars 1864 (§ 5), le reglement russe de 1869 (§ 7) et les instructions
fran~aises du 2p juillet 1870 (art. 7). L'Institut de droit international,
qui,. dans sa derniere seance, a essaye de codi:fier les lois du blocus, a
aussi declare formellement que l'acces du port bloque devait etre
interdit au moyen de vaisseaux de gnerre. (Du Blocus Maritime,
p. 132.)

Fauchille also says of the opinion expressed at the
meeting of the Institute of International Law in 1877
(Annuaire 1878, p. 110) in regard to the difference between blockade by ships or by coast batteries or torpedoes which render access to the port impossible:
Nous crayons done que l'en1ploi de torpilles, nullement defendu par
la declaration internationale du 11 decembre 1868, est legitime pour
former nn blocus lorsque leur disposition est telle qu'elle permet un
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investissement effectif. Et il en sera ainsi, si, outre l'escadre volante,
il se trouve devant la cote ennemie des vaisseaux dont les torpilles sont
entre elles a une distance telle que leur puissance explosible puisse
embrasser tout 1'espace de mer qui les separe d u vaissea u qui les porte
ou qui s'etend entre chacune d'elles. (Du lllocus :Maritime, p. 134.)

Fauchille says of the propriety of blockade by sinking
vessels loaded with stones before the blockaded port:
Pour resoudre cette question il faut, ce nous semble, envisager
plusieurs hypotheses: Supposons d'abord qu'outre la ligne de pierres
il se trouve devant le port une escadre de vaisseaux en nombre suffisant
pour avertir tous les navires etrangers de !'existence du blocus. En
-ce cas, le blocus par pierres sera-t-il legitime? Nons devons faire une
djstinction. De deux chases l'une: Ou bien la ligne de pierres est une
ligne ininterrompue et alors ce mode de blocus.n'est pas legitime. En
-effet, quoique bloque, un port ne se trouve point pour cela fenne a
tous les vaisseaux etrangers: selon !'usage international, certains
batiments peuvent encore sortir du port durant les premieres semaines
du blocus, et meme pendant la duree de l'investissement la place
reste toujours accessible a certains navires particuliers; or, avec le
systeine que nous ~upposons, comment ces vaisseaux pourraient-ils
penetrer dans le lieu bloque ou s'en eloigner? Ce serait chose impossible, car, en verite, on ne peut obliger la flotte bloquante a ouvrir
un passage dans la ligne de pierres a chaque fois qu'un de ces batiments
voudrait passer! Ou bien, au contraire, la ligne de barrage n'est pas
ininterrompue et renferme certains passages; le blocus par pierres est
alors parfaitement legitime, puisque ces passages, sans empecher
l'effectivite du blocus, permettent I' entree ou la sortie de laplace aux
batiments qui ont ce droit. Ces passages, disons-nous, ne rendent pas
le blocus non effectif, attendu qu'ils sont connus des seuls vaisseaux
bl<?quants, et que ces vaisseaux bloquants sont supposes etre en nombre suffisant pour avertir les neutres, les visiter et poursuivre ceux qui
resisteraient a leurs ordres.
Cette premiere hypothese est purement theorique, jamais elle ne se
realisera dans la pratique, car elle n'offre au belligerant bloquant aucun
:avantage special. Un blocus par pierres ne sera applique par un
Etat qu'autant qu'il presentera pour celui-ci une certaine utilite, et il
n'offrira quelque utilite que s'il necessite pour son existence l'emploi
d'un nombre de batiments moins considerable que le blocus par vais.seaux stationnes. Pour examiner si un semblable moyen est vraiment
legitime, il faut done supposer qu'il n'y a devant la place a.insi cerne
que quelques rares croiseurs insuffisants pour prevenir de !'existence
du blocus tousles navires qui se presenteraient. Or, dans ce cas, une
objection nouvelle s'eleve aussitot. De nombreux navires pourront
echapper a la surveillance des croiseurs; ignorant !'existence du
blocus, ils s'approcheront sans crainte du port bloque, et ils iront se
briser sur la ligne de pierres qui ferme !'entree de la place: des dammages considerables seront ainsi infliges a des innocents. Un pareil
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resultat ne peut, ce nous semble, permettre aucun doute sur la legitimite d~ systeme qui l'entraine. Ce systeme n'est done, comme l'a
dit le president des Etats confeder6s, Jefferson Davis (:Message du 12
janvier 1863), qu'une "odieuse barbarie." Certes, aucune definition
ne pouvait mieux convenir au blocus par pierres qui fut etabli en 1861
par les Americains, puisque ceux-ci avaient declare n'y recourir que
parce qu'ils ne possedaient pas une flotte suffisante pour constituer,
avec des navires, un blocus effectif. (Du Blocus :Maritime, p. 144.)

Pradier-Fodere agrees vvith Fauchille that the maintenance of a blockade by coast batteries is allowable, citing
a treaty between France and Denmark of 17 42, the German code, and other sources. He also says:
La seule regie en cette matiere est que les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs, c' est-a-dire main tenus par une force su:ffisante pour interdire reellement l'acces du littoral de l'ennemi: or, les
matelots et les soldats qui desservent les batteries constituent bien une
fo~ce, et si cette force est suffisante pour interdire l'acces du littoral,
l'entree ou la sortie des ports, il est difficile de ne pas dire qu'il y a la
un blocus effectif, quoique, a la verite, les blocus maritimes soient lepius generalement constitu€s et maintenus par des forces navales.
Les blocus par batteries placees sur les cotes sont une exception a la
maniere ordinaire de bloquer, mais ne sont pas une exception a une
regie qui n'existe pas, et, des lors, il n'y a pas lieu d'appliquer les
principes de !'interpretation.
Les memes observations doivent etre faites, et la meme solution doit
etre clonnee, au sujet de !'interdiction de l'acces d'un littoral, ou d'un
port, au moyen de torpilles dormantes repandues devant le lieu qu'on
veut bloquer. Ces torpilles, qui font explosion au contact des navires,
s'opposent a !'entree dans les ports, ou ala sortie de ces ports, par tout
batiment de guerre ou de commerce, neutre ou ennemi, et realisent un
bloc1;1-s tres ahsolu, tres effectif. Ce n'est pas le blocus ordinaire et.
regulier, ce n' est point le blocus effectif, tel que le definissaient les
N eutralites armees de 1780 et 1800, ni meme la declaration d u congres
de Paris de 1856, mais c'est un moyen de fermeture qui expose a un
danger evident tout navire qui tenterait de la forcer, et qui ne pouvait
etre vise avant !'invention et la vulgarisation des torpilles. Ces engins
de guerre, dont l'usage est condamne par l'humanite, mais licite d'apres
le droit international, pouvant etre disposes de maniere a constituer
un investissement complet, il n'y a pas de raison determinante bien
serieuse pour ne pas admettre les blocus au moyen de torpilles;
d'autant plus que ce genre de blocus n'exclut pas, mais meme exige,
la presence de navires de guerre, afin de concilier ce moyen de fermeture avec la necessite generalement reconnue aujourd'hui d'une notification speciale faite en dehors de la notification diplomatique, pour
surveiller les torpilles posees et pour les defendre contre les entreprises
de l'ennemi bloque. Ce besoin de maintenir des navires de guerre
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dans les parages ou les torpilles sont placees, enleve necessairement
beaucoup d'avantages a cette maniere de bloquer, et l'on peut dire
que si les blocus par torpilles sont possibles et licites, ce n' est que
comme complement des blocus par navires. (8 Droit Int. Public.
no. 3116.)

La\vrence, speaking of the maintenance of blockade,
says:
But it is not necessary that channels should in every case be closed
by ships, t h ough a 1naritime blockade without vessels to support it
would b e a contradiction in terms. As an operation supplementary
t o those of the fleet , a waterway may be closed by stones, sunken hulls,
torpedoes, or other obstructions. When, in 1861, Earl Russell remonstrated on behalf of the British Government against the attempt made
by the Federal forces to block u p some of the approaches to Charleston
and Savannah by sinking vessels in the channels, Mr. Seward replied
th at the obstructions were only temporary and would be removed at
t he termination of th e war. I n this particular case there was no intention to inflict pern1anent in jury upon "the com1nerce of nations and
the free intercourse of the Southern States of America with the civilized world." Bu t even if such a design had been entertained, it is
difficult t o see on what grounds of law neuti:als could protest against it.
A belligerent, who may kn ock the fortified ports of his enemy to pieces
by bombardment if they resist his attack, may surely destroy the approaches to them from the sea in order to further the objects of his war.
Neutrals are jealous, and properly jealous, of methods which inflict
severe injury on· their trade; but they can hardly claim to make its
future prosperity the measure of the legality of hostile acts. (P rinciples of lnt . Law, p . 583 .)

Opinion o.f P rqfessor Lawrence on t~e Hague Convention.-Speaking of the convention in regard to the laying
of submarine automatic contact mines, Professor Lawrence says :
Here we have a code which possesses the great advan tage of being
short, terse, and free from legal t ech n icalities. But unfortunately
t h e first t wo articles are greatly diminished in force by a subsequent
provision, and the third is useless. He must indeed be a curiously
simple-minded naval commander who cannot think of smne other
reason for laying a cordon of mines off an enemy's port than that of
intercep t ing commercial shipping. Even if there be n o gunboat , however aged and rotten , reposing on the mud of some interior creek, or
no naval store, however ill-furnished and depleted, hidden in some
remote corner, there always remains the resource of alleging that the
enemy's warships must be prevented frmn gaining the shelter of the
harbour. Germany saw this and made a reservation against the regulation on the ground that " the belligerent has only to assert a different
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object in order to 1nake it illusory." One would have thought her next
step would be to suggest that it be turned into a reality. But she objected to a British proposal to prohibit outright the use of contact 1nines
for closing against cmnmerce ports that were not being attacked from
the sea, and her opposition was backed by France and Russia. The
result is that, so far as the conference is concerned, no restraint has
been put on the activity of belligerents in this direction, though there
is good reason for the assertion that it would be absolutely contrary
to' existing International Law. (International Problmns and Hague
Conferences, p. 122.)
Just as a consideration of the law of contraband in conference 1nust
lead to discussion on the carriage of food stuffs in neutral vessels to unblockaded belligerent ports, so it will be impossible to deal with the
law of blockade without encountering the question of how a lawful
blockade is constituted. For generations past there has been one cmnmon element in all the answers that have been given. vVithout exception they have asserted or assumed that the closure of the blockaded
port must be effected by ships. There have been controversies as to
the nun1ber of ships to be employed, the necessity of a cross fire being
brought to bear from theni on any vessel attempting to enter, the manifest nature of the danger threatened by them, and the question whether
they must be ·stationed on the spot or may be allowed to cruise within
reach of it. But no State has ever claimed the right to institute a
blockade without placing some of its men-of-war in close proximity
to the place blockaded. Yet at the last Hague Conference such a
clai1n was made, not indeed directly, but by implication. The rejection of the British proposal to li1nit the use of anchored contact mines
to the attack and defence of fortified naval· ports involved a belief in
the right to use then1 for closing against commerce ports which were.
not being attacked from the sea. A prohibition against laying them
"off the coasts and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting conlme!·cial shipping" was indeed inserted in the convention on the
subject, but we have already (see pp. 122, 123) exposed its futility.
On this point the proceedings of the conference were reactionary in the
highest degree. Whereas in the past the only way of closing an enemy's
port against all neutral commerce was to blockade it, and the only way
to blockade it was to station a ship or ships in such a position as to
create evident danger to all vessels attempting ingress or egress, for
the future it will suffice in the judgment of many powers, to lay a cordon of anchored contact mines across the approaches. Neutrals must
indeed have lost all virility if they will quietly submit to this. It
will not mean the comparative triviality of having their ships and
goods confiscated by a belligerent Prize Court. They will be destroyed
instead; and all on board will be sent to their doom. (Ibid., p. 189.)

Dangers from the use of mines for blockade.-It is evident that there are many dangers from the use of mines
in blockade. If notification is not given to every vessel
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approaching the line of blockade, vessels may run upon
mines. It is usually admitted that a vessel mav occasionally pass the line of blockade without being seen by
the blockading forces, perhaps by reason of darkness or
storm. Vessels may approach the line of blockade not
knowing of its existence and innocently try to enter the
port. Neutral public vessels may even when knowing
of blockade approach the port. If in such a case, the
blockading vessels are absent in pursuit of a vessel which
has violated a blockade; are driven away by the stress
of the weather; are driven away by the forces of the
other belligerent, without ·removing the mine~, there
remains a hidden danger to the vessels innocently approaching the port. A neutral attempting to violate a
blockade, if captured, is liable, after trial by a proper court,
to condemnation of vessel and cargo. A neutral vessel
approaching, perhaps innocently, a port blockaded by
mines, is liable to be destroyed without trial, and not
. merely may the vessel and cargo be sunk but the lives of
' the officers and crew Inay be sacrificed.
A neutral coming within the area of actual hostilities
is generally held liable to the consequences of his action.
Therefore, a difference may be made in the means used in
war in case the place blockaded is a military stronghold
of the enemy. It :rpay be necessary that such places be
closed to ingress or egress by mines.
It seems, therefore, that there should be a distinction
made in the use of mines for the purpose of closing ports,
and that the use of mines for commercial blockades
should not be allowed, or if allowed should be under very
careful restrictions.
However, the Hague Convention of 1907 only prohibits the use of mines for "the sole object of intercepting
commercial shipping." As has been said it is very easy
to introduce an additional object for which a blockade is
maintained while still leaving innocent shipping liable to
gravest dangers.
From the nature of the blockade, as stated in this
Situation V, there is a small blockading force from which
it might be inferred that it was rather a commercial than
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a military blockade. The representatives of neutral
States protest against the use of mines before the port.
Protest would naturally not be lodged -against the use
· of mines in any reasonable manner before a military
stronghold.
CONCLUSION .

Under the strict law such use of mines is not prohibited. It would seem, however, that mines should not
be used for the maintenance of a commercial blockade
and that neutrals would have good cause to protest
against such use, which protest a belligerent should heed.
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